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Abstract
The rights to groundwater belong to the landowner. Therefore, access to
this resource is privy to well-to-do farmers and is beyond the reach of
resource-poor farmers. The only option left with them is water markets.
The present study has aimed at understanding the operations of
groundwater markets in fragile conditions and has identified the losers
and gainers in the game of water markets in the long-run. It has been found
that water markets mitigate inequalities in accessibility to groundwater
resource in the short-run. But, faster and excessive use of groundwater
may increase inequity among the farming community in the long-run. In
water-scarce regions, water markets function on the principles of profit
maximization. The different strategies are adopted to make groundwater
available for sale. The water markets operate under monopsonic conditions.
The terms and conditions of groundwater markets, i.e. kind or cash, vary
differently across the regions. The study has suggested that water rights
should be redefined and nationalization of groundwater resource is the
only alternative for its sustainable management. To restrict the over-
exploitation of aquifers, water trading should be allowed in a limited manner.
Programmes for recharging aquifer should be initiated on a large scale. A
community-based action is required for the efficient use of water resources
in water-scarce conditions through effective institutional arrangement.
1. Introduction
The technological and institutional changes have resulted in the increase
in demand for irrigation by manifold. Several surface irrigation schemes
were launched to meet the increasing water requirement. However, these
schemes were not able to provide sufficient water for irrigation. Therefore,
groundwater irrigation was recognized as an alternative. Today, groundwater
accounts for more than half of the total irrigation in India. In the water
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deficient regions like Rajasthan, groundwater is the major source of irrigation.
More than two-thirds of the irrigation demand is met by groundwater. Merely,
one per cent of the country’s water is available to 5 per cent of the population
living in 10 per cent of the total geographical area. The agriculture sector is
the major consumer of water, where 90 per cent of the total availability of
water is used for irrigation. The scarcity of water resources coupled with
fast increase in demand for water has resulted in overexploitation of aquifers.
The right to groundwater belongs to the landowner, as it forms a part of
the dominant heritage and land ownership. The consequence of such a legal
framework is that only the landowners can have access to groundwater in
the country. It leaves out all the landless and tribes who may have community
rights over the land. It also implies that rich landlords can be waterlords and
indulge in its open selling, as much as they wish (Singh, 1991). As a result
access to this resource is privy to well-to-do farmers and it is beyond the
reach of resource-poor farmers, who cannot install their own wells. The
only option left with these farmers is to buy it from water markets. There
are two viewpoints on the issue of water markets. One is in favour of water
markets for making them competitive and efficient on the ground of equity
in resource distribution (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Kolavalli and
Chicoine, 1987; Strosser and Meinzen-Dick, 1994). The other is against the
water markets as it amounts to favouring the rich over the poor by monopoly
rents, leading to worsening of income distribution (Barah et al., 1993;
Janakrajan, 1993; Shah, 1993; Singh, 2002, Saleth, 1996). Both the arguments
hold good under different situations. The former may be true in water
endowed regions and the latter in water-scarce regions (Singh, 1999). Water
markets can be considered as a game in which both buyers and sellers
adopt strategies at their own levels. The sellers look at the position of profit
maximization through either increasing water sale or charging higher prices.
The buyers attempt to gain maximum utility in the given water resource
constraints.
Market structure of groundwater is determined by not only its supply
but also the institutional mechanism, both formal and informal, which has a
strong hold on the operation of water markets. The main difference between
formal and informal set up is the way in which water trade is conducted.
Under formal framework, government establishes legal tradable water rights
to retain and extend the advantages of water markets. Under informal
arrangement, users contract for water on their own and no legal recognition
is granted to water trade. In the absence of formal rules, a dense social
network leads to the development of customs, laws, thrust and normative
provisions that constitute an informal framework and has the pervasive
influence on the economy (Aron, 2000). Similarly, the market structure of
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On the backdrop of groundwater markets and their implications in diverse
conditions, an attempt has been made in the present study to (i) understand
the operation of groundwater markets in fragile conditions, and (ii) identify
the losers and gainers in the game of water markets in the long-run.
2. Access to Irrigation Facilities and Water Markets
According to the state level estimates, ownership and access to resources
including land and water show that nearly one-third area is under irrigation
(see Table 1). The distribution of irrigation facilities among different categories
of farms has shown that there is an inverse relationship between the farm-
size and proportion of the area under irrigation. It is because of the fact that
only a few farmers have access to irrigation facilities, whereas, a majority
of farmers irrigate their land through water markets in very limited proportion,
i.e. less than one per cent. It shows the crucial role of water markets in the
case of poor categories of farmers.
3. Status of Groundwater Resources
The present section deals with the changing status of groundwater
resources across the regions of India. To generalize the implications of
groundwater markets of aquifer, the data relating to potential zones estimated
by the Department of Groundwater of State Government, were used.
There has been a faster decrease in the availability of groundwater
resource in the arid zone as compared to that in the semi-arid zone during
the past one and a half decades. On the other hand, a little decrease has
been recorded in the semi-arid zone. It may be because the region is
surrounded by river basin that enables it to maintain groundwater status,
whereas the arid area is largely out of such basin that further leads to low
Table 1. Usage of irrigation facilities across different farm-sizes
Size of farm Average         Distribution of irrigation facilities
size of          Cultivated area Unculti- Area irrigation
farms Irrigated Unirrigated vated  by water
area markets
Marginal 0.52 37.83 62.17 5.20 39.27
Small 1.40 39.17 60.83 6.66 28.83
Semi-Medium 2.96 35.25 64.75 10.01 21.07
Medium 6.22 28.82 71.18 11.27 23.97
Large 19.13 25.22 74.78 22.21 0.67
Overall 3.29 30.80 69.20 14.17 18.67
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groundwater recharge. The difference in climatic and geo-physical conditions
results in variations in groundwater availability across the regions. In the
arid zone, a drastic increase in groundwater draft has been recorded, i.e.
about four times in the past two decades. In absolute terms, it was very
small under the semi-arid condition, but it increased substantially. It was
inferred that the use of groundwater for irrigation increased rapidly, which
caused depletion of the aquifer at a faster rate.
Water balance is the difference between utilizable availability and net
draft. Groundwater balance is a commonly used criterion for evaluating this
resource. In the present context, estimates of groundwater balance and
level of development show that an alarming situation has emerged (see
Table 2 and Fig. 1). In the arid zone, groundwater balance was going down
drastically. In the semi-arid region, a similar situation was emerging. It
showed that demand for irrigation water had increased tremendously. To
meet the demand of water for irrigation, the well owners, especially the
resource-rich, have adopted different technological measures. These
measures include use of vertical boring technology that causes depletion of
aquifer. Besides, continuous efforts through various institutional interventions
are being made to increase agricultural production (Singh, 1998). It ultimately
has resulted in increasing the demand for irrigation water that is being fulfilled
by water markets in the respective areas.
Table 2. Status of groundwater resources in sample areas
Year Availability Net Ground- Stage of Category
of ground- groundwater  water ground- of develop-
 water draft balance water ment
(million cubic metres) (per cent)
Kuchaman (Arid-zone)
1984 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
1991 129.95  42.37  87.58 132.06 Over-exploited
1999  66.67  89.88 -23.21 134.81 Over-exploited
2001  92.21 138.87 -46.66 150.59 Over-exploited
2004  67.50 165.45 -97.95 245.12 Over-exploited
Rajgarh (Semi-arid zone)
1984  29.05  15.40  13.65  52.99 White
1991  28.02  34.40  -6.38 122.75 Over-exploited
1999  21.28  21.33  -0.05 100.26 Over-exploited
2001  34.23  47.71 -13.48 139.38 Over-exploited
2004  33.61  48.61 -15.00 144.64 Over-exploited
Source: Various Reports of the Department of Groundwater, Government of
Rajasthan, Jaipur
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3. Failure of Water Sources (Wells)
The extent of failure of water sources is also a major indicator of
estimating sustainability as well as equity implication. The sharp increase
has been recorded in the number of wells, it is 130 per cent in the arid and
99 per cent in the semi-arid regions (see Table 3). This shows that it will
have serious implications on equity aspect in the long-run. This would increase
the use of groundwater, leading to further depletion of aquifer. In such a
situation, poor well-owners would not be in a position to undertake deepening
of their wells every year. In other words, chasing watertable is beyond the
reach of poor farmers. Under such circumstances, they have to depend
upon other well-owners for groundwater irrigation. Otherwise, they would
be deprived of the access to groundwater on one hand and the resource-
rich individuals would chase watertable by making heavy investment in
extracting water on the other. It may be inferred that increased use of
groundwater results in inequitable distribution of this precious resource.
There has been a wide variation in the proportion of failure of wells
across the regions during past three decades (Fig. 2). In the regions, this
variation was recorded in one-third to two-thirds of wells, whereas, it
increased from one-tenth to one-fourth cases due to depletion of aquifer
condition and use pattern. It has also emerged that such an increasing trend
in the failure of wells would be a major threat to sustainability of water
resource.
4. Operation of Groundwater Markets
Water markets function differently under different conditions. Besides
the natural and physical factors like climatic conditions, soil, quality and
Fig. 1. Stages of groundwater development in selected areas350 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.20  July-December 2007
quantity of water, depth of watertable, etc., the institutional arrangements
also play an important role in this game. Now, the question that arises is:
How the various categories of water-users behave in the changing situations
and environments?’ An attempt has been made to answer this question in
this section.
4.1. Who Are the Players in the Game?
To understand the operation of game it is essential to know about the
players and their behaviour. Past studies (Meinzen-Dick, 1996;
Narayanamoorthy, 1994; Shah, 1993) conducted in different parts of the
country showed that the well-owners who owned limited size holdings had
a larger participation than those who owned larger size holdings. It is due to
Table 3. Changing status of water sources (wells) in tehsils in the seleceted villages
Nawa (Arid zone) Rajgarh (Semi-arid zone)
Number of wells Number of wells
Year In use Out of use Total In use Out of use Total
(pre cent) (per cent) (pre cent) (per cent)
1971 57 43 4317 90 10 6252
1981 68 32 5661 88 12 7515
1991 57 43 8601 80 20 11035
1996 51 49 8702 78 22 13585
2002 31 69 9775 77 23 11345
2004 29 71 9922 76 24 12465
Source: District Statistical Outlines (Nagaur and Alwar), Directorate of Economics
and Statistics, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur (various issues).
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the fact the former have surplus water after irrigating their lands. However,
this study does not support this hypothesis. In the arid village, only about
one-third of the total water sellers belonged to small and semi-medium
categories, whereas two-thirds of them belonged to medium and large farm-
size categories. This may be attributed to the following three reasons: (i)
The proxy of marginal and small farms to the well owners, (ii) The sellers
reduce their own demand and save water for sale by adopting less water-
intensive cropping patterns, and (iii) Availability of water is relatively higher
with large-size farmers because they have capacity to manage watertable
due to their sound economic condition (Singh, 2000; Moench, 1992; Shah,
1985). Ultimately, well owners belonging to large farm-size category have
the option of selling water to resource-poor farmers. In the arid village, just
half of the buyers belonged to the semi-medium category, followed by
marginal and small farm-sizes. In the semi-arid village, unlike the arid village,
the sellers were in equal proportion in marginal, small and semi-medium
farm-sizes. And this was the major reason of their participation in water
markets. The majority of the buyers were marginal farms owners.
In the overall scenario, the sellers of water belonged to medium and
large farms and the buyers to marginal and small farms. Therefore, argument
of resource-rich households’ ability to extract groundwater in larger quantum
Table 4. Distribution of households participating in water marketing according
to farm-size
Category Farms-size (per cent) Total
sample
 Marginal Small Semi-medium Mediam Large size (No.)
Arid village (Kukanwali)
Self-users 0 0 15 77 8 13
Sellers 0 11 21 42 26 19
Buyers 25 13 50 12 0 8
Overall 5 8 25 42 15 40
Semi-arid village (Srichandpura)
Self-users 17 50 33 0 0 6
Sellers 33 33 34 0 0 6
Buyers 70 15 15 0 0 13
Overall 48 28 24 0 0 25
Overall
Self-users 5 16 21 53 5 19
Sellers 8 16 24 32 20 25
Buyers 52 14 29 5 0 21
Overall 22 15 25 29 9 65
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holds true, in general and the arid village, in particular. Certain well-owners
having large size of holdings remained out from water business.
4.2. Factors Affecting Participation in Water Marketing
An attempt has been made to identify the factors that affect the
participation of farm households in water trading. Broadly, water-users
including self-users, sellers and buyers had different reasons under which
they participated in water marketing. These were:
(i) Under arid conditions, largely, there was no availability of surplus water
with the self-users. It was because of the fact that larger proportion
(60%) of the total irrigated area was allocated to water-intensive crops
like wheat and barley (see for details, Singh, 2000). Under semi-arid
conditions, the proportion of self-users who did not have surplus water
was considerably high (83%) (see Table 5) The study has also revealed
that adoption of water-saving strategies was the pre-condition for
participation in water markets. The intensity of wells in the area also
influenced the water markets. According to 38 per cent of total self-
users in the arid and 17 per cent in the semi-arid conditions, non-
availability of water buyers caused their non-participation in water
marketing. Difficulties in transportation of water to far-off places and
rivalries/ tensions among the village communities were the other reasons
that restricted water trading.
(ii) In the arid regions, the quality of water limits water marketing, as
according to an estimate, 73 per cent of the India’s saline water is in
Table 5. Reasons for participation and non-participation in water marketing
(per cent)
Particulars Arid village Semi-arid village Overall
Self-Users’ reasons for non-participation
• No surplus water 46 83 58
• No buyers 38 17 32
• Quality of Water 16 0 10
Sellers’ reasons for participation
• Surplus water 74 83 76
• Profit earning 26 50 32
• Power policy 26 17 24
Buyers’ reasons for participation
• Owned land but no well 88 46 66
• Limited & fluctuating water supply 12 54 34
Source: Singh (2000)Singh: Groundwater Markets in Water-scarce Regions 353
the arid region of Rajasthan (Rathore, 2001). In the arid village under
study, 16 per cent of the total self-users were not involved in water
marketing considering that its quality may be deteriorated further due
to excessive water extraction. Such perceptions were missing in the
semi-arid village. The problem of salinity was very acute all over the
water scarce regions, it varied even within small distances.
(iii) The sellers largely enter the water markets because they have surplus
water, after irrigating their own fields. Other factors that encouraged
the well-owners to sell water were profit earning and the existing power
pricing policy. More than one-fourth of water sellers in the arid and
half in semi-arid areas sold water for profit. The ‘Flat-Rate’ power
pricing policy had also encouraged participation in water markets.
(iv) Buyers’ participation in water markets was a sort of compulsion. These
buyers did not have their own water sources and had to depend on
well-owners for irrigation of their lands. The proportion of these buyers
was quite high, 88 per cent in the arid and 46 per cent in the semi-arid
villages. The fluctuating water supply was another major factor effecting
buying of water.
4.3. Boundaries of the Game: Terms and Conditions of Water
Markets
The players, in general and sellers, in particular have marked boundaries
for the game in their respective areas. These boundaries may be known as
the terms and conditions for water transactions among the sellers and buyers.
Broadly, the two types of terms and conditions were cash-based and kind-
based. Each type had wide variations in its operation across the stakeholders.
Three types of contracts on which water markets operate, were:
(i) Time-based Contract: Under this contract, the seller provides water to
the buyer on hourly charges. It is prevalent in the semi-arid areas. The
charges varied according to operation of wells. If the seller owned electric
motor and electricity charges were on the flat-rate basis, then the rate was
Rs 30/- per hour. In the case of pro-rate system, the charge was Rs 5 per
unit of electricity consumed. If the sellers owned and operated diesel oil
engine, then the charges were Rs 15/- per hour plus fuel charges.
(ii) Crop and Input Sharing Contract: Under this contract, the seller
provides water while the buyer provides land and labour. The paid-out costs
on inputs applied for production are shared in equal proportions between
buyer and seller. This condition of water trading was prevailing in the arid
village. Largely, water markets operated under this condition.354 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.20  July-December 2007
(iii) Crop Sharing Contract: Under this contract, the buyer provides land
and the seller provides water. All the paid-out costs on inputs applied for
crop production are borne by the seller. The seller provides pre-fixed quantity
of agricultural produce (1.60 q/ha) to landowner. This condition also prevailed
in the arid village. Only a limited number (12%) of buyers and sellers were
involved in water transactions under this contract. Because of small size of
holdings and short supply of labour with the landowner on one hand, and
socio-economic pressure of resource-rich farmer on poor landowners on
the other, the present contract of water markets was being chosen.
The types of contract for water markets are determined by the informal
village institutions, viz. village conventions, and seller’s priority and motive.
The well owners, in general and the sellers, in particular determine the price
level of water. It was experienced that price of water was correlated with
the cost on energy used in water extraction, i.e. electricity and/ or diesel oil.
The seller always tries to get maximum benefit from water trading. Under
crop and input sharing contract, the well owner exploits the buyers by using
monopsonist power. Crop-sharing contract is quite close to reverse land
tenancy wherein land is leased in favour of rich farmer who has better
control over key productive resources. But, exploitation of resource-poor
farmers continues, as in the case of land tenancy. Due to weak bargaining
strength of poor farmers, the resource rich enjoy the hegemonistic power to
exploit the former for gains in a number of interlinked markets of the rural
economy (Murty, 1998).
4.4. Functioning of Groundwater Markets
In this section, the functioning of groundwater markets across the
regions has been examined. In arid village, the average command area of
each well (6.40 ha) was substantially higher than that in the semi-arid village
(3.62 ha). It was because of the fact in the arid village, the farmers were
using sprinkler method of irrigation and grew less water-consuming crops
like mustard and gram in larger proportions. In the semi-arid village, the
flow method of irrigation was in practice. Thus, water-saving practices
adopted by the farming community in water-scarce regions had resulted in
larger area under each well (NABARD, 1989). The well owners used nearly
two-thirds of the total extracted quantum of water to irrigate their own
lands and the rest of water was sold to the buyers. In the semi-arid village,
the situation was completely reversed where water was being used largely
to irrigate the buyers’ land (see Table 6).
There was a considerable difference in the income to sellers from the
sale of water. It was attributed to variations in the terms and conditions of
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the water charges in kind, which were substantially higher than the
expenditure. There was a considerable difference in the operational
expenditure incurred in water extraction in both the selected villages. It was
more than double per well in the arid village. One of the reasons for it was
the capacity of pumpsets used for withdrawal of groundwater. In the selected
villages, the pumpsets were installed up to the capacity of 10 HP capacities.
On other hand, a user of pumpsets of higher capacity, 15 HP and above, had
to pay higher electricity charges, as fixed by the State Electricity Board
(Singh, 2000).
Largely, under the prevailing water markets conditions, the sellers were
able to meet all operational expenditures, including annual charges paid for
electricity/diesel consumption, maintenance charges and interest paid on
the investment made for the sale of water. In the arid and semi-arid villages,
the average area of 2.26 ha and 2.23 ha was irrigated through water
marketing practices, respectively. It showed that there was slight difference
in the area on which the sellers provided irrigation facilities after meeting
their own water requirement. In the arid village, the sellers were able to
recover the operational and maintenance (O&M) expenditure to a larger
extent (about 99%), while in the semi-arid village, not only O&M expenditure
was met but the sellers could obtain profit also from water business. The
study has shown that water markets function on the principle of profit
maximization. The buyers either had to compromise on the terms and
conditions of water  sellers or migrate elsewhere to earn their livelihood and
it generally happened in the water-scarce areas of Rajasthan. Thus, the
monopsony power of the sellers dominated the water markets. The
Table 6. Functioning of groundwater markets in sample villages
Particulars Arid village Semi-arid village Overall
(Kukanwali) (Srichandpura)
Area irrigated by sellers (ha) 6.40 3.62 5.53
Proportion of land irrigated by
Sellers 64.69 38.40 62.93
Buyers 35.31 61.60 37.07
Annual income received from 17368 9237 15417
sale of water (Rs)
Annual operation & maintenance (Rs) 17518 7608 15388
Expenditure recovered by 99.14 121.41 100.19
sale of water (%)
Average investment made 12723 6500 11556
for sale of water (Rs)
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development of groundwater markets was dependent on the accessibility to
infrastructural and institutional facilities like transportation and communication,
institutional credit and agricultural marketing (Singh, 1998). In the context
of availability of basic facilities, farmers always preferred short-term gains
in water trade that had unfavorable consequences in the long-run.
4.5. Role of Water Markets in Farm Business
To assess the impact of water markets on farm business, three types of
costs were considered, viz. A1, C2 and C3. The cost A1 includes paid-out
cost incurred on crop production, cost C2 covers the total cost on cultivation,
and cost C3 represents the total cost on production, including management
charges. In the arid region, there was no noticeable difference in the net
returns among the self-users and sellers of water (see Table 7). In the
semi-arid regions, buyers and sellers occupied almost similar positions in
earning the net returns, except that returns were more for self-users. It
may be inferred from the fact that water markets contributed in correcting
the inequalities. In the arid region, the condition of buyers was noticeable;
they received lower returns, even negative sometimes, may be due to paying
of higher water charges. But, the water buyers were compelled to remain
in the farm business for food security and lack of other employment
opportunities in the region.
Table 7. Farm economic analysis across the regions and water users
Particulars Players in the game
Self-users Sellers Buyers
Arid region
Cost A1  7,296  7035 13,444
Cost C2 14,928 15,308 21,906
Cost C3 16,421 16,839 24,097
Gross returns 20,326 20,747 22,383
Net returns over cost C2  5,397  5,439  477
Net returns over cost C3  3,904  3,908  -1,714
Semi-arid region
Cost A1  6,939  7,060  8,454
Cost C2 15,440 16,474 16,942
Cost C3 16,980 18,121 18,636
Gross returns 24,267 23,299 23,597
Net returns over cost C2  8,827  6,825  6,655
Net returns over cost C3  7,283  5,178  4,961
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5. Who is Loser in the Game? Emergence of Externalities
The externalities are non-reimbursed costs or uncharged benefits
occurring to people as a result of some one else’s action. Typically, we are
concerned about externalities that impose cost on others, for instance, over-
extraction of groundwater that results in irreparable loss to the society in
the long-run. In the present context, a question that arises is : how development
of groundwater markets creates externalities? Efforts have been made to
answer this question with the help of Fig. 3. It shows that the seller extracts
OQ volume of groundwater at the prevailing OP water price. Under similar
conditions, the well owner, in general and sellers, in particular opt for options
of water saving by cultivating less water-intensive crops and minimizing the
number of irrigations. Thus, the seller makes available water for sale to his
buyers out of OQ quantity of the extracted water. Under the existing price
mechanism, the resource-rich farmer adopts technological measures to
increase the water supply due to his capacity to invest in water extraction
equipment. This intervention of the well owner results in increase in the
supply from SS to S1S1 by extracting OQ1 volume of groundwater at the
same OP price level. Now, the seller sells a lager volume of water to his
buyers and earns more profits than that before.
Fig. 3. Water extraction for sale
It may be inferred that when the well owner participates in water business
and extracts groundwater at its maximum level then it would result in aquifer
depletion. In other words, seller’s technological intervention in water
extraction creates externalities in the long-run.
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The main conclusions that emerge from the study are:
(i) Water markets mitigate the inequalities in the accessibility to
groundwater resources. The individuals who do not own their wells,358 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.20  July-December 2007
get access to groundwater irrigation through water markets. Thus,
resource-poor farmers can allocate a large proportion of the total cropped
area to irrigated crops and make best use of their limited size of holding.
However, over-exploitation of water may result in adverse impact in
the long-run. Therefore, urgent and serious attention is needed to divert
from the emerging adverse implications.
(ii) In water-scarce regions, water markets work on the principles of profit
maximization. The sellers adopt strategies at the farm level to make
groundwater available for sale. The buyers either purchase water at
terms and conditions of sellers or get deprived from groundwater
irrigation. Thus, in water-scarce regions, water markets function under
monoposony conditions.
(iii) The terms and conditions of groundwater markets, viz. in kind and
cash work differently. In water-scarce regions, the water prices remain
substantially higher than those in water-endowed regions. Also, the
sellers try to make more water available to the buyers with a view to
increasing agricultural production so that they may get the maximum
crop share as water price.
(iv) Various institutional provisions made to check over-exploitation of
groundwater have proved ineffective in regulating water extraction.
Often, such measures are taken when the situation reaches an alarming
stage. If some precautionary measures are undertaken, then situation
may be saved from reaching the critical stage. Under such a situation,
water markets make the situation from bad to worse
(v) The study has indicated that the existing institutional set up both formal
and informal behaves in an adverse manner. Under existing property
rights, groundwater is considered as an open resource over which
landholders have absolute rights. This results in unchecked extraction
of groundwater. The unrestricted access makes the situation more
complicated by converting Common Property Resources (CPRs) into
Open Access Resources (OARs). Informal institutional arrangements
have also added their undesirable role in groundwater depletion.
Policy Implications
Some important policy implications derived from the study are:
• Water rights should be defined. Groundwater should be treated as a
common property resource in the real sense. Nationalization of
groundwater resource is the only alternative for its sustainable use, in
general and in water-scarce region, in particular.Singh: Groundwater Markets in Water-scarce Regions 359
• An integral approach should be followed at various levels such as
different government departments, in general and those concerned with
groundwater resources, in particular. The institutional arrangements that
manage the groundwater markets under particular conditions should be
the major concern of the policymaking and implementing agencies.
• Effective provisions should be made to restrict the over-exploitation of
aquifers. Similarly, water trading should be allowed in a limited manner.
• Information system should be made more transparent to initiate action
before reaching the alarming stage.
• Programmes for recharging of aquifers should be initiated on a large
scale. The involvement of voluntary sector in aquifer recharging should
be encouraged.
• A community based action is required for the efficient use of water
resources in water-scarce conditions. The model of Pani-Panchayat in
Maharastra can be experimented in other water-scarce regions (Pangare
and Lokur, 1996). In this model, the community decides the cropping
pattern based on availability of irrigation water. The similar efforts should
be experimented in groundwater use also.
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